

ГЛОБАЛИЗАЦИЯ: ПОЛЕМИКА ЦИВИЛИЗАЦИЙ

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M.G. Weissman, A.A. Alimov

TIME OF TROUBLES: SMUTNOE VREMIA

Статья отражает сотрудничество американских и российских историков и показывает, что обе страны и их историки должны определить, какое прошлое мы не хотим в нашем будущем. Дается общая характеристика политического и социально-экономического состояния России на переломе XVI–XVII вв. Особое внимание уделено периоду «Смуты», когда, по мнению многих историков, в России развернулась масштабная гражданская война, сопровождавшаяся попытками иностранного вмешательства в борьбе за российский трон. При подготовке статьи авторы использовали и русско- и англоязычные работы по этому этапу истории Российского государства. Такой подход к работе отражает взаимный интерес американских и российских историков к более глубокому пониманию истории наших стран.

Ключевые слова:

бояре, гражданская война, заговор, Земский собор, иностранные захватчики, история, казачество, ложный царь, опричники, поляки, российский престол, царь, шведы.

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© Вайсман Мелвин – PhD, профессор, Университет штата Колорадо, Колорадо Спрингс, Колорадо, США; e-mail: mweissman22@g.com

© Алимов Андрей Алексеевич – кандидат исторических наук, доцент, Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет; руководитель, Научная программа «Международное сотрудничество в области окружающей среды и развития, Санкт-Петербург; e-mail: alimovandrey@yandex.ru

Each country has its own history reflecting multiple factors that include political and economic forces as well as nature. Domestic and foreign policy is a barometer of the pressure of these forces.

The article is aimed at understanding the main features of political, economical and other characteristics of life and historical development which can put any country in a very problematic situation and come to a challenge of losing its sovereignty and independence.

If, as in the case of Russia, these forces become unwieldy, as they did at the end of the 16th century, tragedy awaits. That Russia overcame the challenges presented from 1584 to 1613 is a testament to the resiliency and endurance of its people.

The trauma of those frightful years are engrained in Russia and influenced its entire future into its present modern Russian Federation. This period is known as the Time of troubles as it is used in British and American language. The beginning of that period started with the death of Ivan IV or Ivan the Terrible in 1584. Why are these years called “The time of troubles” or

“Smutnoe Vremia?” In the Russian language there are two ways to translate and understand that period of Russian history. It can be translated as “dim period” when it was difficult to see and to understand what was happening.

The other translation was connected with the many troubles that occurred at the beginning of the 17th century that included civil war, political and economic upheaval, and peasant violence. (Two centuries earlier Europe had undergone similar traumas.)

This period, from the death of Ivan IV who was also known as Ivan the Terrible in 1584 to the election of Michael Romanov in 1613, witnessed the complete and total collapse of Russian society. Provinces fell away as military commanders deserted.

One of the main reasons (or roots) for the instability resulted from Ivan IV’s domestic and foreign policy. From the middle of the 16th century Russian foreign policy was closely connected with military operations. The first steps were taken in 1552 and 1556 when Ivan attacked and defeated Kazan and Astrakhan khanates that were controlled by the Tatars.

These Tatars were the remnants of the Golden Horde that had split into several khanates at the end of 15th century when Ivan III, the Great, the grandfather of Ivan IV, the first Prince of all the Russian lands ended the period of the Mongol Yoke. Even though defeated by Ivan III they continued to raid the territory of Muscovy in search of booty and slaves.

Ivan IV was successful in these military campaigns against the two khanates. Defeating the Tatars brought Ivan and Muscovy into the Caspian Sea where he was able to initiate trade relations with Persia and the Orient.

As a result he became overly confident and pursued a lengthy Livonian War that began auspiciously but soon turned to a series of defeats and protracted hostilities that extended decades. As already stated the Livonian knights were a military order in a small state on the shores of the Baltic Sea. Ivan IV, as all Russia's rulers, recognized that their country had no access to warm water ports. To gain that access the tsars exerted their resources. Russia, however, would have to wait for Peter the Great to finally realize that success. The war was started in the 1560's and at first Russian military forces were successful. But when Poland and Sweden realized the extent of Muscovy's objective they entered the war on the side of Livonia. Russia would eventually sue for peace at a frightful price. Vast territories of Russia were occupied by Poland and Sweden, thousands perished, peasants left their landowners and fled to the southern regions of the country.

Ivan IV died in 1584. The successor of Ivan was his son, Feodor and the Rurik's dynasty would not be able to withstand his incapacity and would end with his reign. The Tsar was mentally compromised and not fit to assume responsibilities. In autocracy, power is concentrated at the top. From there it is parceled to individuals and groups who are to be servitors to their benefactor. Never must they forget that their positions are tenuous. If there is weakness at the apex of power, it encourages a hornet's nest of power brokers. Weakness at the top creates a vacuum of power. This is evident in the events within Muscovy from 1584–1613.

Feodor's wife Irina was a strong influence over the Tsar. Her brother Boris Godunov acted as the power broker inside the court. The road to power for Boris was through his influence over the Tsar. Theoretically speaking Feodor had a brother – Dmitri, Ivan IV's son from his seventh wife. But he was a very young boy, given an appanage and sent with his mother to a small town of Uglich, where he died mysteriously.

After Feodor died, his wife Irina chose the convent to being regent. This provided Boris Godunov the opportunity to become the

power behind the throne. Eventually, with the death of Feodor in 1598; Boris became Tsar. His elevation was not a forgone conclusion as it required all his Machiavellian skill. At last he managed to be elected by the Landed Assembly, the state institution set by Ivan IV in the middle of the XVI century. Boris, however, was not popular among the boyars and nobility, thus from the outset of his reign he faced overt and covert opposition to both his domestic and foreign policies. Boris was a son of an "oprichnik" whom Ivan IV used in the second part of his reign. Boris did not use the same policy as Ivan IV did, but he sent his opponents out of Moscow, executing, exiling, and tonsuring others for the monasteries. It happened that Feodor Romanov, the future patriarch of Russia and the father of the first tsar of Romanov's dynasty was one among them.

During Boris Godunov's reign not only social and political powers influenced the situation in Muscovy but natural forces played their negative role in the history of the country. At the onset of the seventeenth century in 1602 there was a mini-ice age leading to starvation on a grand scale, the situation becoming intolerable as famine and disease were rampant, this led to a complete breakdown in interpersonal relations as people fed on one another, both figuratively and literally [2, p. 216; 3, p. 28]. With the death of Ivan IV in 1584 a dynasty was to come to an end, and a generation of turbulence was about to begin. Conditions in Muscovy portend greater turmoil. This is not the advantage of hindsight, for with Ivan's death his feeble minded son Fedor became the Tsar.

Who was it who said that "the best laid plans of mice and men often go awry"? The specter of chaos and famine soon became reality. Thousands, possibly a third of Russia's people died of starvation. It was a famine of biblical dimension. The casualties in an agrarian society where 90% were peasants, was dramatic. The starving ate grass, bark, fetid animals and their own dead. According to Charles Dunning, "More than one hundred thousand people died in Moscow during the famine (fifty thousand in just seven months during 1602) and were buried in three huge common graves" [3, pp. 17, 99].

Until the reign of Peter the Great Muscovy's rulers had not instituted a workable system of succession. Upon the death of the Tsar, the problem of who should be next fanned intrigue as the lure of power haunted contenders for the crown. As Fedor was incapable of ruling, Boris Godunov, whose father was an oprichnik – a pillar of Ivan IV rule and confidant of Ivan IV. De facto he became regent but there was no document confirming the fact. Thus the immediate ques-

16 tion became “Who was to rule?” Between 1584 and 1598 when on 6 January Fedor died, Regent Godunov became Tsar on 3 September 1598. During these years of Feodor’s reign, Godunov, as regent, addressed the usual “house cleaning” with political purges, arrests and some mysterious deaths. Godunov, however, was capable, intelligent, and resourceful as he faced a myriad of potentially impossible tasks. The treasury was in crisis and taxes were not to be had. The land suffered famine brought about by poor harvests, and estates abandoned. Godunov’s response was to lower taxes, exempt the lower nobility who served in the cavalry, and reclaim runaway peasants, while denying their traditional opportunity to relocate on St. George’s Day. (This policy of tying the peasant to a specific location was the policy of Ivan III in 1497.) Godunov also began a program of expanding military recruitment. Unfortunately, the result was a failure as Russia proved unprepared for the more sophisticated world of European diplomacy and war that harkened the beginning of the seventeenth century. Old enemies Sweden, Poland-Lithuania, and Germany, had incorporated that new technology that would prove so disastrous when used against Russia before the death of Tsar Boris Godunov in 1605.

In 1590 there began a five year war with Sweden. This was the opening moment of a future of major foreign intervention and meddling by Russia’s enemies. Russia became the ground upon which Poland-Lithuania fought to extend their influence. The Polish king, Sigismund III, influenced by the Jesuits, was a Catholic zealot who considered the East to be peopled by heretics awaiting conversion. To the south there were rivers – the Terek, the Don, where Zaporozhian Cossacks were staying, (Cossacks were a very specific social layer in Russia – mainly they were former peasants who left their landowners and managed to flee south where they hoped for freedom and no meddling from Muscovy. At first the Government tried to find and return them to their landowners, and even severely punished them. In the future, however, Cossacks were used as border guards defending the southern borders of the country) and Tatars of the Crimea, whose raids continued to be a sharp thorn for Russia. In spite of this, Moscow continued its expansion into Siberia and the Crimea where fortified military outposts were built along the Volga and farther to East. (During the reign of Ivan IV there is the story of the brigand Yermak Timofeevitch and his Cossacks who began the military expansion into and across Siberia.)

From 1425 to 1825 violence and murder accompanied each succession to the throne and this would be no different. With the death of

Fedor on 6 January came the end of 700 years of the Rurik dynasty. During his reign, Russian society experienced total fragmentation. Central authority became stultified, loyalty was forgotten, and provinces fell away. There was the desertion of *pomesticki* (land lords or land owners – a NEW word which appeared somewhere in the XV century, they were PUT on the land – in Russian pomeschat and they had to serve the court. If they avoided service they would lose the land. Many of them became “dvoryane” – the nobles. But nobility in Russia was not the same as in Europe. It was a specific Russian feature of formation of a new pillar for the power).

But nature became an actor which put the nation to a tragedy. Hundreds of thousands of ordinary people died because of starvation and famine that led to cannibalism. These are an indication of the depth of the chaos. With Godunov as Tsar, Moscow began to experience a depth of agonies that are heart rending; it is the beginning of Moscow’s despair. A hornet’s nest of disaffected boyars began to spread rumors that questioned the new Tsar’s legitimacy, and gossip can be a deadly weapon. Godunov was thus faced with a series of crises: his legitimacy, the disaffected of Moscow, and the foreign enemies ready to exploit Moscow’s weakness. By the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century Muscovy was clearly fracturing. It was a society that had lost it way and whatever continuity that it had possessed. The question might be asked: What were the ties that bound great boyars, priests, lesser nobles, peasants, Cossacks, and merchants?

As pointed out, with the death of the gentle yet mentally weak Tsar Fedor in 1598, he was succeeded by the son of an oprichnik Boris Godunov; and so began a tableau of every manner of violence coupled with starvation and the appearance of Pretenders. The mysterious death of the *appanage* Tsarevich Dimitrii led to the question of Godunov’s legitimacy and produced a stew of conflict exploited by the boyars. These conditions furnished them an opportunity to recast their role in Muscovy’s power structure. Boyar interests were promoted by the *Boyaraskaia Duma* (this Duma appeared long ago – it was a specific state institution and one of the pillars of the Prince power) and intrigue. The objectives of the boyars centered in the Duma while those of the lesser classes was the *Zemskii Sobor* (the landed Assembly was established by Ivan IV to decrease the power of boyars). A constitutional monarchy in Russia may have germinated among some of the boyars during the Smutnoe Vremia, but it was too soon following the death of Tsar Fedor to adopt such a challenging alternative to the traditional system. In any case it was too soon following the death of Tsar Feodor to predict

change. Society was rent with too much trauma of indentured slavery and famine that proved fertile soil for all elements of society to embrace violence. The Romanovs led a knot of boyars, who had in common, the greatest antipathy against Godunov. Another intriguer in the opposition clique was Prince Vasilii Shuiskii. Uncomfortable with the new tsar, they feared him as another Ivan IV. They believed that only with the power of the tsar, circumscribed by an election process, could boyar power be restored and assured [4, p. 26–27]. Godunov responded with secret police, arrests, and intimidation, thereby gaining leverage against the boyars.

Ivan IV had been a nemesis to the greater boyars. The *oprichniki* were his means to weaken their internecine plotting that made court life a veritable morass of intrigue, murder, imprisonment, and assassination. Ivan utilized the *Oprichniki* to ferret out those he suspected of traitorous behavior, or who might contemplate treason in the future. Boyars who refused to take the oath to the tsarevich when Ivan was ill were sacrificed to the Tsar's wrath. Godunov, however, owed his elevation to tsar on 3 September 1598 to his election by the *Zemski Sobor*. As suggested earlier Godunov (advisor to Ivan IV) was intelligent and capable. Noting the technological weakness of Russia, he sent thirty students to European universities. Unfortunately for Russia, the lure of the west proved stronger than that of their homeland as only two of their number returned. To those boyars who opposed him he was implacable in punishment. A. F. Platonov observed that: "His love of justice had no price. He mercilessly killed those given to all sorts of bribery so loathsome was it to him" [6, p. 47]. The eminent Russian historian V.O. Kluchevsky was not complimentary to the Godunov clan.

"Although he succeeded in interning the boyar order, with its age long traditions, in town mansion, country house, and sequestered goal, it was not long before there stepped into its place, from hole and crevice, the obscure family of the Godunov's, who surrounded the throne and thronged the palace of their kinsman with a jealous retinue" [4, p. 28].

The drama, however, was only in its infancy with the appearance of a series of pretenders to the throne. It was the onset of pretendership that would continue into the nineteenth century. On May 15, 1591 the son of Ivan IV, the Tsarevich Dimitrii died of a knife wound to the throat. Dimitrii had been given an *appanage* (assigned territory to provide a living) in Uglich. While suspicion fell on Godunov, a commission appointed to investigate cleared him of any complicity in Dimitrii's death. The commission, in investigating, hypothesized that Dimitrii suffered from epilepsy, had a gran mal (violent

epileptic fit), and accidentally stabbed himself while playing in the yard of the house where he lived. Moscow's agony was to grow apace as doubts concerning Godunov's legitimacy opened a hornet's nest of cross purposes. The case against Godunov, the commission finding him innocent of murder, had failed to allay suspicion. The horrors of famine, cannibalism, and civil war were viewed as God's punishment for the crime. The argument then and later, was that Godunov had appointed the commission. Its spokesman, Vasilii Shuiskii, who became Tsar after Godunov had died, and the First Pretender was murdered, changed his position as to the guilt or innocence of Godunov, claiming that the initial verdict was a fraud. The temperament of contemporary and later narratives saw God's wrath in the catastrophe of the *Smutnoe Vremia*. As Robert Crummey observes "for Godunov's murder of Dimitrii and his subjects' quiet acquiescence in the crime... Boris was overthrown by a pretender..." [2, p. 210].

Robert Crummey opines that Muscovy was faced with three crises: Dynastic, Societal and National. How was Muscovy to address the issue of the Tsar's legitimacy, with the alienated and disaffected people of Moscow, and the enemies anxious to exploit Muscovy's weakness? Poland-Lithuania, Sweden, Cossacks, Crimean Tatars, all or any could prey on Muscovy [2, p. 211].

Skrinnikov, a contemporary Russian historian in his book Mikhail Romanov agrees that the foreign presence had already been set in motion by the weaknesses of Muscovy. The result was the *Smutnoe Vremia*: civil war, foreign invaders, pretenders, Cossacks, those who supported boyars, peoples militias, but to name main actors.

Exacerbating the chaos was the appearance of the first pretender in 1604. Claiming to be the *appanage* holder Tsarevich Dimitrii Ivanovich, and supported in his claim by Poland, the defrocked monk Grishka Otrepiev challenged Godunov for the throne. In October 1604, Otrepiev, with Cossack and Polish support, invaded Russia with 3500 to 4000 troops, moving into the valley of Seversk on the Donets River, with additional support from Ukraine. A rag tag and motley assortment as these should have been easily dealt with, but unfortunately, the opposite occurred. The few thousand of this force grew with the addition of Zaporozhian Cossacks, so that his force grew to 10,000. In addition to Cossacks there were the poorest representatives of the nobility and forever disaffected peasantry who joined his banner, as many of them had fled the harsh regime of Muscovy with its onerous taxes. These areas were occupied by Cossacks, free men who had a grievance against Tsar Boris, and the

18 government's attempts to make them the Tsar's servants. It made small difference that in the famine of 1601–1603 Godunov had done what he could to alleviate their suffering, he even tried to distribute bread and money among the citizens of Moscow that led to more displaced peasantry arriving in hopes of food. Disaffection was especially the case in the Borderlands in the south. Here resided the “belligerent people” who opposed the encroachment of central government [6, p. 204]. Russia's people were prepared to embrace stories of the miraculous, the belief that the Tsar was a Christ figure, with the addition of a horrific famine, was seen as ushering in the end of days, the end of the world. The burden on Muscovy's peasantry witnessed their status eroded from free to serf, tied to the land. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, Muscovy's expansion had transformed free land into crown lands, *ochina* of the tsar. Peasants had escaped one form of slavery only to find another; the State was to blame. The disaffected were permanent members of Russian society, ready, as time would show, to answer the call to insurrection [6, p. 197]. Then Boris died on 13 April 1605. Ill since 1602, suffering a possible stroke, dizziness, loss of motor functions, he was dead at 53, poison may have hastened his death. Troops thought to be loyal now turned against the Godunovs and on 10 June 1605 Godunov's widow, son Tsar Fedor Borisovich were murdered and his daughter raped while Vasilii Vasilievich Golitsyn a well-known of one of the richest families watched and enjoyed the moment [4, p. 27, 74].

The boyars now had the opportunity to reassert their authority while establishing parameters on that of the tsar. They pursued this goal until the end of the *Smutnoe Vremia*. From the death of Ivan IV, boyars plotted to achieve a renewal of their powers. Kluchevsky points out that Boris failed to appreciate the historic moment. The *Zemskii Sobor* could have been altered from “a gathering of service officials into a permanent, popular, and representative parliament of the kind we have seen glimmering as an idea in Muscovite minds as early as the reign of Ivan IV.” They made “more than one attempt to establish a State order that was founded upon a written agreement with the Tsar-i.e. upon a formal limitation of the supreme power” [4, p. 28].

The Pretender's appearance, and the sudden death of Boris Godunov in April 1605, resulted in the False Dimitri being proclaimed Tsar. The Pretender had first appeared in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1603. There was a long history of enmity between Moscow and the commonwealth Catholic Poland looked to the east where the Russian Orthodox should be subjected and converted from their “heresy”.

The history of the cultural and religious divide between the Slavic east and Western Europe had its origin in the conversion of the Slavs to eastern Orthodoxy in the tenth century. The Teutonic and Livonian Knights had attacked Russia in the thirteenth century without any success. There had been the lengthy and exhausting conflict (Livonian War 1558–1583) with Ivan IV, another conflict with Sweden 1590–1595. Diplomacy had failed and whatever the origin of the Pretender, whether the Russian Grishka Otrepiev, who served the family of Fedor Romanov the father of the future Tsar Mikhail Romanov, or someone else, he was acknowledged by the Polish court as the miraculously saved young son of Ivan IV, Tsarevich Dimitrii Ivanovich. When the first false Dmitry entered Moscow the mother of the real Dmitry, dead for many years, recognize Grishka Otrepiev as her son; miraculously escaped from death His acknowledgement only increased tensions, spawned civil war, and did nothing to relieve the famine. Kluchevsky comments that a probability supporting the idea of a pretender originated with a clique of boyars led by the Romanovs. “Though it was baked upon a Polish stove, it was mixed in Moscow” [6, p. 192–194]. Grishka's life, or what is thought to be his life, began as a servant to the Romanovs. From that status he was able to enter the priesthood, where he either learned to read and write or brought that skill with him. Whether delusional or not, he declared that he would be Tsar. His behavior was brought to the attention of Tsar Godunov, and Otrepiev left the monastery and escaped to Lithuania. Godunov did not believe that the Poles bore sole responsibility for selecting and training the pretender. Suspicion fell upon a clique of boyars led by the Romanovs. In 1605 Godunov declared that the pretender had been one of the servants and even a slave in the Romanov household, a thief, and a defrocked monk. The potential for further chaos was Grishka's relationship with the Jesuits and his apostasy to Catholicism in 1604. Boris met the threat with his own forces led by trusted princes Trubetskoi, Mstislavsky, Shuskii and Golitsyn [6, p. 197]. For the malcontents within Muscovy their objective was clear, “to destroy the hated dynasty of the Godunovs” [8, pp. 1–2, 4, 7]. At this point the story becomes foggy as there is the question of verification; was Grishka Otrepiev the First Pretender? Physically unremarkable, he proved bright and capable. Surrounded by a guard of boyars, mercenaries and Cossacks, Otrepiev warily advanced into Moscow. Once settled in the Kremlin the behavior of the Pretender quickly dispelled any doubts other than he was a fraud. Polish fusiliers and mercenaries did not enforce order but plucked what they would from the Muscovites. As a result,

plots were hatched, plots were thwarted, but the boyars were not deterred, and were eventually successful. In his short and violent career he shocked many of the Russian Orthodox clerics, boyars, and townspeople by discarding many traditions of Muscovite ceremonials, being approachable rather than aloof. As a result he was popular with the masses outside Moscow. Within Moscow it was a different story as whispering grew branding him a fraud. There were several witnesses that impugned the claim of the First Pretender, among them were two monks and an uncle. Their testimony, however, was unsubstantiated and thus, during the reign of Boris Godunov, no competent witness came forward. The Pretender, in favoring his family, itinerant Poles, Cossacks, and Catholics led to serious plotting against him by 1606. Shuiskii and Golitsyn sent a secret message to the Polish king Sigismund III suggesting that his son Wladyslav might be considered as Tsar. Sigismund III at first agreed and then changed his mind, offering himself as candidate [7, pp. 164–176].

Muscovy's weakness created a vacuum of power between her and rapacious neighbors. Wasting no opportunity, Poland, Sweden and the Crimean Tatars either threatened or occupied Muscovite territory. Platonov examines the unrelenting social and economic chaos from 1598 to 1613 [7]. Hindsight suggests that it is remarkable that Muscovy survived and avoided irreparable social and economic disintegration.

These years of internal chaos and external predations gave the boyars an opportunity to regain autonomy lost to Ivan IV. The *Zemskii Sobor*, it was thought, would resist autocracy and replace it with limited monarchy. This system would marginalize those classes below the boyars. In England the opposition of the baron led to the Magna Carta of 1215, a document placing limits on monarchical power. A *Boyaraskaia Duma*, a reflection of boyar interests, might attempt the same in Russia. Some may consider this to be a "stretch" but it is worth considering. A major dilemma for Russia was how to choose a tsar. Should it be election by a Boyar Duma or primogeniture and the rights of birth? This conundrum plagued and fed the 14 years of chaos. If the boyars were to have their way, tsarist autocracy, so violently and relentlessly imposed by Ivan IV, would be curtailed, replaced by partnership with the boyars.

Those that the Pretender took as confidants alienated an increasingly broad components of Moscow. His apostasy to Catholicism was especially damning as Jesuits occupied their residence below the Kremlin Walls, where they had ready access to Otrepiev. Conditions within Muscovy and Moscow were unsettled and on the cusp of violence. R.G.Skrinnikov, an expert on

the *Smutnoe Vremia*, describes the Pretender succumbing to the aura of being Tsar becoming embroiled in international adventurism. Deciding to be King of the Polish *Rzecz Pospolita (Republic)*, he encouraged disaffected Polish Protestants and Orthodox with a promise of 100,000 florins to depose Sigismund III and offer the throne to the Pretender. (In today's dollars one gold florin is worth 140.00.) "The king was beside himself when he learned about this....The chancellor of Lithuania told members of the parliament in Warsaw that the king's enemies had offered the Polish crown to Tsar Dimitrii and were in clandestine contact with him" [8, p. 13]. There were other avenues for Sigismund and he was quick to have them investigated. The boyars sent Ivan Osechka Bezobrazov to Warsaw in December 1605. Ostensibly the mission was to prepare the coming of Moscow ambassadors. The boyars, however, used Bezobrazov to deliver a secret message to the king. "...tell the king they intended to get rid of the Deceiver and offer the throne to Sigismund's son Wladyslav." It becomes obvious that the Pretender would not long be the tsar [8, p.17–18].

According to Pskovian Chronicle there was no written document but an oath by Michael Romanov that protected the boyars. Kluchevsky investigated this thorny issue and pointed out that the possibility of a written charter without knowledge of the *Zemskii Sobor*, was not possible. Whether such a document did exist or not, it eventually made little difference as Peter the Great would ensure that autocracy was uncompromised [4, p. 78–79]. There existed a dynamic tug-of-war between the *Boyaraskaia Duma*, *Zemskii sobor*, and the new Tsar. These representative assemblies were very active during Michael's reign. Foreign and domestic issues were debated there. For a brief moment, the *Zemskii Sobor* exercised more authority than it had previously, or would ever in the future. Kluchevsky's analysis is brilliant as he explains the role of the *Zemskii Sobor* and the *Boyaraskaia Duma*.

Both Vasili Shuiskii and Michael had similar constraints. The *Boyaraskaia Duma (An informal council of advisors)* was a force that exercised an authority limiting tsarist power. The *Boyaraskaia Duma* limited the power of the tsar while the *Zemskii Sobor* (assembly of the land) represented all the classes of Muscovy with the exception of peasants circumscribed that of the Duma. In the future, the Duma would devolve into an advisory body to the tsar. It would be convened at the pleasure of the tsar and its advice was not binding. "The Sobor did not so much decide issues of national policy as lend it support to decisions that the tsar and his advisers had already made." "In this way the power of the new Tsar came to consist of

20 | two parallel ambiguities. In origin it was hereditary elective; in composition it was limited autocratic" [4, p. 175, 177].

The Time of Troubles was a tsunami, tornado and fire. Large tracts of land, entire provinces, were bereft of agriculturalists. Incentives came from landowners to draw peasants. Slaves (the holops in Russian terminology), as they assumed their new roles, became agriculturalists and were given land, seed, housing, and tools. Over the succeeding decades, this class of non-free workers increased and they would grow to become a majority of peasant labor. The seventeenth century witnessed an acceleration of serfdom as well as slave (holops) labor for field work [3, p. 119].

The chaos accompanying the Time of Troubles has challenged and perplexed historians since the sixteenth century. The hypotheses have been many, including peasant discontent or boyar discontent. There was the unruly element of Cossacks, and in the nineteenth century, V. Lenin who in examining the peasant unrest during the *Smutnoe Vremia* emphasized, as one would anticipate, class antagonisms. All these hypotheses are reviewed by Chester S.L. Dunning in his study *Russia's First Civil War*. Dunning is of the opinion that the root of the conflicts was the rise of a centralized, militaristic state whose fiscal requirements, especially for war, became as onerous as to initiate the Time of Troubles. Muscovy had expanded swiftly, resulting in the challenge of control of vast territories including Siberia, and was just too much strain for an unprepared government.

While this hypothesis is plausible, it does not address the unique qualities of the Russian psyche. Orthodoxy was never challenged by scholasticism and relied instead on responding and initiating the beliefs in ceremony, ritual, and the supernatural. How can pretendership be otherwise explained?

From the first pretender, Grishka Otrepiev, into the nineteenth century, Russia was the stage where at least forty pretenders sought avenues to power. The First False Dimitrii was viewed by many as the "good tsar" who opposed the "bad tsar" Boris Godunov. The myth that Dimitrii of Uglich had escaped assassination, not once in 1591 but again in 1606, led to at least a dozen more pretenders in the seventeenth century "and at least forty four in the eighteenth century, culminating in one of the most famous cases of all – the rebel leader Emilian Pugachev claiming to be Tsar Peter III." (The Pugachev uprising of 1773–1775, took place during the reign Catherine the Great) [3, p. 239–240].

The assassination of the first False Dimitrii was followed by the arrest of his wife Marina

Mniszech and her entourage. The "false tsar" was dead and the throne was again empty. Vasilii Ivanovich Shuiskii would assume the crown and suffer four years of increasing chaos, another pretender, and the Bolitnikov uprising. On May 19th two days following the death of the first pretender, Shuiskii became tsar.

The scene in the Kremlin was tense as the boyars met, debated, now that Tsar Dimitrii was assassinated how should they proceed. Shuiskii had plotted the regicide as he openly denounced Dimitrii. (As Dimitrii was Tsar, his assassination was a regicide). Conveniently for the conspirators, a number of documents appeared disclosing a Polish plot and that Dimitrii had converted to Catholicism [3, p. 241; 7, p. 82–83, 86].

Candidates were considered and rejected, among who was Michael Romanov. The Romanov candidate was too young and would have to wait. Shuiskii, therefore, was the only viable candidate. He successfully connived for the throne that, under more peaceful circumstances, would not have been his. To his fellow conspirators it was essential that he be chosen, otherwise there was a probability that he would be condemned for regicide [8, p. 44–45].

For the boyars the Pretender was a pawn, a means to an end: the destruction of the Godunovs. In that they were successful. The Pretender was murdered, dragged through the streets, dismembered, burned, his ashes loaded into cannon and... In his place the boyars elected Vasilii Ivanovich Shuiskii, believing that through him their authority would be assured at the expense of tsarist autocracy. Powerful boyar clans supported Shuiskii and applied themselves to their agenda. He would be the boyar's Tsar. Was there, in fact, some document limiting tsarist autocracy? At this point the scene becomes murky. In 1613 did the newly elected Romanov Tsar Michael sign a charter of boyar privileges? Previous tsars had viewed boyars as their servants/slaves. Within and between the boyar classes there was intrigue, violence and feuding. The challenge was how to avoid such behavior in the future [7, p. 86].

On 19 May 1606 Vasilii Ivanovich Shuiskii became Tsar. There was no "honeymoon" that followed his elevation, but rather a future of upheaval and tragedy. We have already noted the consequences of famine and social chaos. That situation was not alleviated. Stirring the pot was the appearance of a second pretender and the Bolotnikov uprising [7]. Dunning is of the opinion that the boyar oligarchy behind Shuiskii was not an attempt to constitutionally restrain the Tsar. Platonov and Kluchevsky would disagree with so quick a dismissal. The

failure of the Pretender and his replacement by the Boyar Tsar Shuiskii resounded into Muscovy's borderland. Any renewal of central authority with its demanding tax burden, recruitment, and generally onerous regulations, were met with resistance. In this instance it was an uprising led by Ivan Bolotnikov (for some time he was a galley slave.) He appealed to the peasantry for the overthrow of growing serfdom, attack the boyar and attack their boyar oppressors. He ordered "the slaves of boyars to slay their own masters, and promised them the masters' wives, patrimonies, and *pomestie* estates...despicable and unspeakable brigands..." [7, p. 93]. Platonov explains that Bolotnikov's insurrection was a serious attempt to overthrow the existing order. For those who followed him, and others in Russia's future, this was a call to freedom. In December 1606 Tsar Shuiskii defeated Bolotnikov, driving him to Tula and Kaluga. It was the remnants of this army that joined the Brigand (False Pretender II) [7, p. 95].

History was against Shuiskii as there were too many hurdles to cope with. Plots and foreign invasion were endemic during the few years of his reign. A palace coup, that was abortive, occurred on 25 February 1609. The plotters attempted to rouse Moscow with cries of "He was elected without popular consent" [8, p. 73-77].

Poor Shuiskii, increasingly alone, deserted by close advisors he thought friends. Foreign intervention fed Muscovy's crisis as there were the Polish-Lithuanian Sigismund III and Karl IX of Sweden. (It is Skrinnikov opinion that there was one more person – from Germany) In the same month of February, Skopin-Shuiskii met with Swedish negotiators and signed a letter of understanding. Karl IX was to send troops to aid Moscow, in return for the Territory of Karela. Skrinnikov describes a desperate situation. Karl IX sent mercenaries, a polyglot force of multi-national origin. Skopin-Shuiskii now, at least, had a significant force that he used in an attack on Polish forces investing the St.Sergius monastery, a short distance from Moscow.

As this drama was developing Tsar Shuiskii thought to make overtures to the Crimean Tatars. The tragic outcome was Tatar pillage and an uprising in towns directly affected by Tatar raids [ф30, pp. 157-158]. Rather than alleviate the pressure, Shuiskii, as Machiavellian as he may have considered his actions, provoked townspeople to resist.

Then, into the stew, came Sigismund III. He advised, he thought that his presence, with a small force, would lead Smolensk to open its gates, ring its bells, and welcome him.

That was not to be the case, as this heavily defended city kept its gates locked and fiercely defended its walls. Sigismund's arrogance, his Catholic zealotry, and grandiose plans of colonizing Russia, accomplished little, other than arousing Russians to oppose him. Tatar raids, mercenary armies, foreign monarchies plans of conquest, led to stern Russian resistance. Moscow, occupied by strutting, arrogant Poles, aroused the passions of resistance to their presence. The lowest point motivated a growing national awareness that led to the expulsion of the outsiders.

Platonov describes a Muscovy torn by encroachments from Poland as well as the continuation of pretenders. Onto the scene in June 1607 came an unknown "with the scornful sobriquet the "Brigand"". Evidence suggests that he was a foil for King Sigismund III of Poland-Lithuania. To the Brigand's standard came Cossacks (not unusual well into the future), troops from Poland-Lithuania, prominent nobility of Poland-Lithuania, Moscow deserters, elements of Bolotnikov's army, and finally small groups of wandering soldiers. The Second False Dimitrii revealed himself in Starodub. Tsar Shuiskii was not able to discern his identity and used the sobriquet *vor* (rogue). Was he another priest or a petty noble? The hypotheses are many; from being the son of Prince Andrei Kurbskii, who fled from Ivan IV, to a drummer, a servant of the First False Dimitrii, or possibly a Jew, it continues a mystery. In any case his behavior is described as uncouth and slovenly [7, p. 96].

Challenges to Moscow's authority from the Time of Troubles into future centuries were accompanied by a pretender around whom they would coalesce. In that terrible year, 1607, a review of tsareviches made their appearance. It is remindful of a warped talent program where the contestants enter stage right and exit stage left. Some of their names are listed by Platonov: "Tsarevich Peter Feodorovich, August Prince Ivan, Lavrenty, Feodor, Klementy, Savely, Simeon, Vasily, Eroshka, Gavrilka, Martynka and so forth" [3, p. 283; 7, p. 110-111].

This violent chapter in the Time of Troubles ended in the fall 1607. Tsar Shuiskii routed the Brigand's forces at Tula and captured many of the leaders including Tsarevich Peter Feodorovich and Bolotnikov. Serfdom was intact as the insurrection had failed and the boyars were victorious. The developing social, political, and economic structure of Muscovy was not altered. The Tsar's nephew Michael Skopin-Shuiskii, a brilliant military leader, was able to exploit his victory by marching from Novgorod to Moscow in May 1609. The various elements of Muscovy's army drew to-

gether and initiated a campaign in the winter 1609–1610. The pressure was too great for the Brigand and on 1 January 1610 he fled from Tushino for Kaluga [3, p. 404–405; 7, p. 114].

The trail of misfortune, however, continued unabated as King Sigismund III attacked Muscovite territory. If Sigismund hoped for cooperation among forces comprised of Cossacks, Poles, and “brigands”, he was quickly disappointed. There just was no unity of purpose among these disparate elements. This was a low point for the Muscovites as the accumulation of hardships, both natural and human, conspired to a further breakdown of “political discipline and morality” [3, p. 408; 7, p. 118–119].

The story continues to the bizarre as in February 1610, the Tsarina Marina, the wife of the First Pretender, having escaped to cause difficulties, travelled to Kaluga and embraced her “husband”, thus the “Tsar Dimitrii” was again a player in the tragedy. The following month the brilliant Michael Skopin-Shuiskii, after supposedly urging his uncle to abdicate, died under questionable circumstances. Was it poison? There is no definitive evidence one way or the other. He was, by all accounts, a robust soldier. To Tsar Vasiliu Shuiskii the threat of Prince Mikhail Vasilievich Skopin-Shuiskii was his claim to the throne. His death pointed to Tsar Shuiskii. As to the death of Skopin-Shuiskii, Platonov cites S.M. Soloviev, who opined that it “broke the tie of the Russian people with Shuisky” [7].

Within the year Tsar Shuiskii would find himself isolated. Abandoned by the boyars he was forced to abdicate. Under duress he was tonsured, becoming Varlaam the monk. He had refused to accept a grant to an area near Nizhni-Novgorod and, as a result the boyars arrested and had him tonsured.

The last days of Vasiliu Shuiskii’s reign were gloomy. He had lost the support of the boyars who had made him Tsar. On July 16 he was removed from the throne, becoming the monk Varlaam. The situation with the Pretender had not been resolved, as he continued to be supported by important boyars. If Shuiskii could not reclaim the throne, who should replace him? More confusion, as none of the candidates had a majority of support. Polish ambitions of uniting Russia with the *Rechz Pospolita* were viewed favorably by some boyars.

Skrinnikov presents a clear explanation of the events accompanying the departure of Tsar Shuiskii, the continued presence of the False Dimitrii II, an agreement of 16 August 1610 with the Poles that recognized Wladyslav as tsar, and another explosion of disagreement. With Shuiskii gone and no tsar chosen, the potential for even greater chaos was eminent. A tsar had to be in place, thus the for-

tunes of the False Dimitrii II improved, if but for a moment [8, pp. 96–100].

How is it to end? Succeeding years were fraught with invasion. Sigismund III continued his quest to become Tsar. For this prize he pushed his son Wladyslaw out of the competition. The thought of Sigismund, or any foreigners as tsar, mobilized national unity leading to the election of Michael Romanov.

What followed was more chaos and indecision. A *Zemskii Sobor* was to be convened at the same moment as a “gang of seven” boyars, a rump *Zemskii Sobor*, attempted to appoint a new tsar. Would it be Wladyslav the son of Sigismund? That seemed to be the wishes of the seven boyars (they were named “semiboyarshina”). This action proved extremely unpopular and encouraged a number of Muscovites to return their support to the Pretender Dimitrii. What a mess! Wladyslav’s father, Sigismund III then decided that he would rule Russia. The possibility that Sigismund would be tsar was rejected by the boyars. These boyars had been members of a delegation to Sigismund’s camp. Their refusal led to their arrest and imprisonment. One member of the boyar delegation was the monk Varlaam. In September 1612 mysterious deaths claimed him, Prince Golitsyn and Dimitrii Shuiskii, Varlaam’s brother [7, p. 156]. Platonov furnishes significant detail to this last chapter of the Time of Troubles, prior to the selection of Michael Romanov as tsar. The *Sobor* issued a statement “not to choose the Lithuanian or Swedish king...” [7, p. 157]. At the same time (December 1612), confusing the issue of “who was to rule”, both Sigismund and Wladyslav were informed that “the desire to request you as ruler, Great Sovereign, Crown Prince Wladyslav Zhigimundovich” has the support of the boyars [7, p. 157].

Sigismund’s greed for the throne encouraged both the Muscovite upper and lower classes to reject foreign rule with a further codicil that rejected “Marinka and her son.” Thus came the end of pretendership, at least for the immediate future [1, p. 442] Two months later on 17 February 1613 the son of Filaret Romanov, Mikhail Feodorovich was elected Tsar. Mikhail was proclaimed Tsar two weeks later on 21 February. The Tsar’s legitimacy is traceable to Ivan IV’s first wife Anastasia Romanova. Because of his youth (16 years old) his mental and physical weakness, the boyars still had an opportunity to regain power. “Let us have Misha Romanov for he is young and not yet wise; he will suit our purposes” [7, p. 156].

Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov (1613–1645) is described by Platonov and Kostomarov. They provide an interesting description of the convening of a Sobor, how delegates were chosen, the rejection of any foreign kings and

their families, and the challenge of selecting a tsar who would initiate a new dynasty. “Many were the agitations of people, each wanted to act according to his own thinking” [7, p. 157].

Choosing a tsar was clearly a thorny issue as boyars, townspeople, Cossacks, and a multitude of additional interest groups had to make a choice. “They were talking at the *Sobor* about tsareviches who serve in the Muscovite State, and about great families, whom from among them will God grant to the Muscovite State as sovereign” [7, p. 159].

Mikhail, elected on 7 February 1613, was proclaimed two weeks later on 21 February. The intervening period between election and proclamation witnessed a careful assessment of boyar and town reception of a Romanov as Tsar, “only then...was Mikhail Romanov proclaimed tsar...” [8, p. 177–178, 180].

One should not “hold their breath” and feel relieved that the tragedy had finally played itself out. On the contrary, for no sooner was the False Dimitrii II murdered and beheaded than a False Dimitrii III made his appearance. Evidence as to who he was is not extant. He was probably a priest, as he was familiar with church liturgy. A pieced together account described him as being a Muscovite, whose name was either typical Russian Sidor or Matvei. Nothing more is known of his background. He appeared in Novgorod, proclaiming himself the son of Ivan IV, was heckled, and quickly took to his heels. Unfortunately, the Russians had not had enough and many, especially peasants and Cossacks, acknowledged False Dimitrii III as the “good Tsar”, and came to his support. His career took him from Novgorod to Ivangorod, then to Pskov, where he was harassed by the Swedes.

Skrinnikov clears the confusion, pointing out that “The new explosion of sympathy for Dimitrii was a reaction to the attempt to foist on the country another foreign tsar of a different faith” [8, p. 181].

While it was obvious that this person was a fraud, it did not stop the people of Pskov from proclaiming him as the True Sovereign. “On March 2, 1612 a Cossack conclave...announced that the Pskov pretender was the Sovereign.” The Cossacks elected him Tsar [4, p. 57]. What could be the result but more confusion, as many territories refused to accept him? If, at one time, the pretender had garnered support, that was over in the same year of his election. It all came to an ignominious conclusion on 18 May 1612. The pretender, with boyar conspirators bursting into his quarters, attempted escape. Those who accompanied him soon thought better and left him. He was captured by a detachment from

Pskov. “The pretender was conducted through the streets chained to a horse” [8, p. 227].

The Swedish King Karl IX had not been idle. He, as Sigismund III, also coveted the tsarist throne. An enemy of Sigismund III, Karl IX negotiated at Novgorod with Vasilii Buturlin. A secret meeting was held where Novgorod’s representatives offered the throne to the Swedish king. “There is no doubt that all Moscow will agree if Karl IX will see to it that he is Orthodox” [8, p. 146]. This meeting took place on June 1611, just two years before Michaels’s election. Self-interest appeared stronger than national. One of the negotiators observed that: “We shall talk directly with Mr. Jacob de la Gardie (he was the commander of Swedish military regiments and even tried to help Russia) here about choosing a Swedish prince as our grand prince” [8, p. 147].

A National government attempted to make a modicum of sense out of the ongoing chaos. By 1611 it had become clear that resistance to a foreign prince on Moscow’s throne was undeniable. Swedish troops pillaged the Novgorod territory and a call to fellow Russians became shrill.

Before this *opolcheniye* there was an abortive uprising led another one led by Prokopyi Lyapunov. For his efforts he was assassinated.

If there were heroes that stepped forward to direct and encourage their fellow Russians to elect a Russian as Tsar, and clear Muscovy of foreign occupation by Poles and Swedes, these men were there to answer the challenge. Kuzma Minin was the son of a very rich merchant. Kuzma was a butcher with his own shop and Dimitrii Mikhailovich Pozharskii, an aristocrat of meager circumstances as he was not a landowner. These men were the heroes in the struggle against foreign interventionists from Sweden, Poland, and Cossacks. Early in September 1611, Kuzma Minin, a trader in Nizhny-Novgorod was elected to a group of nation oriented citizens. These men were responsible for overseeing the town’s economy. S.F. Platonov quoting an unidentified source comments that Minin “feeds himself from the poor business of selling” [3, p. 433; 5, p. 210; 7, p. 146; 2, p. 229; 8, p. 146].

It was K. Minin who mobilized a renewed energy and, as would be hoped, a successful campaign against the foreign interventionists. K. Minin was selected to organize a levy of troops, and he proved brilliant in that charge. It was one thing to levy combatants, but the challenge was logistics. These men had to be maintained and disciplined. Minin’s passion, so articulated in the accounts of his speeches to assemblies, is a testament to his love and commitment to nation and Orthodoxy. Platonov and Skrinnikov’s accounts

are a construct of the problems confronting Minin, and his steps in addressing each challenge. "Great inspiration distinguished Minin's exhortation; by all accounts he was a man of great temperament and exceptional abilities. Nizhny-Novgorod's citizens met and proceeded with arranging finances to support an army "for the cleansing of the Muscovite State" [7, p. 147]. What the citizens of Nizhny-Novgorod hoped to achieve required military leadership. It was Muscovy's good fortune that a military leader of exceptional ability, Prince Dimitrii Michaelovich Pozharskii, was living in Suzdal, not distant from Nizhny. The Prince was convalescing from a wound and he also suffered from epilepsy. Pozharskii, none the less, accepted the call and, to his banner there rallied many who had been dispossessed by foreign aggressors Wladyslaw from Poland, the Cossacks, with yet another pretender, and the Swedes; all were terrorizing Muscovy. Minin and Pozharskii wanted a tsar chosen by all "whom God shall give us" [7, p. 148].

These men, Minin and Pozharskii, were not revolutionaries. This was not a class struggle. These men were traditionalists who fought valiantly to restore a tsar autocrat to Muscovy. To achieve this goal all effort would be directed. Pozharskii began his campaign in the spring of 1612. The rallying point was Yaroslavl. Learning that they would receive pay, food, and equipment, groups came to serve Prince Dimitrii. There were no traditional advisory committees, no Boyar Duma, no patriarch's council. That may have been just as well, as future events were to show. Rank and privilege, ones place in the boyar hierarchy, more often than not, was a detriment to action. An order issued from a lower ranking boyar to a higher ranking boyar would lead to ferocious opposition on the part of the higher ranking boyar. This would be evident, when in the future, after the success of Pozharskii and Minin, they were ignored by the boyars and the teenage Tsar Michael Romanov. The only exception being the failure of military command among the boyars; when that occurred Pozharskii was recalled to protect Muscovy.

The problem facing Prince Pozharskii was establishing a unified command. There should have been no doubt as to who should be the commander. The higher born boyar Trubetskoi considered Pozharskii low-born and not qualified to order a higher ranking boyar. Trubetskoi was overly cautious and reluctant to lead in battle. He had a number of Cossacks under his command, but he refused to support Pozharskii in a battle before Moscow. To Trubetskoi's chagrin many Cossacks left his banner to join Prince Pozharskii. This did not deter Trubetskoi's trouble making. His ambi-

tion was great but he failed in ability, finally agreeing to combine his men with Pozharskii's.

Upon the petition and compact of all ranks of people, they and the elected man Kuzma Minin stood into unity...to the Muscovite State... in everything, without any cunning design [7, p. 153].

Minin proved an exceptional organizer, fundraiser, and diplomat. The fierce nationalist cajoled and appealed to townsmen and merchants to fulfill an obligation to support the campaign to free Moscow. Skrinnikov describes a scene of chaos, as different factions were unwilling to join and create a more formidable militia. Minin, "the Man Chosen by the Entire Realm" was able to withstand divisiveness and forge a national army. Rubles were collected from territories, individuals, and towns, to support the campaign to free Moscow.

There were now two national armies, the one of Minin and Pozharskii and the other of Cossacks who supported the Third False Pretender Dimitrii [4, p. 58; 5, p. 215; 8, p. 201–203].

A new assembly was established in Yaroslavl to which boyars came who had refused to kiss the cross to the False Dimitrii. Considering themselves privileged, they attempted to gain control of the national assembly. Once again, at this moment and throughout tsarist rule, privilege and rank were more important than ability. Their pretensions caused trouble and dissension in the militia [8, p. 204].

In June 1612 Minin and Pozharskii had succeeded in adding Cossacks to the militia. Freeing Russia was to be a national achievement.

At this moment of crisis there could not have been a more capable commander than Prince Dimitrii Pozharskii. He was noted for his military acumen. As Minin, he had an impressive title: "Steward and Commander Prince Pozharskii, Elected by The Whole People of the Muscovite Realm and All Ranks of the People, Military and Civilian" [8, p. 208–209].

To observe that the situation was complex is an understatement. Dissension within the militia was a constant strain. Disease, horrific food shortages, and the threat of more foreign invasion, beset Pozharskii. In the ranks the common soldier suffered disproportionately to the gentry.

During the Time of Troubles Poland's Sigismund III and his son Wladyslaw had aspired to be tsar. Sweden was also an aspirant. In 1612 the Swedish King Karl IX died. He was succeeded by Gustavus II Adolphus, whose younger brother Prince Karl Philip was reported on his way to Novgorod to be proclaimed Tsar. The behavior of Swedish soldiers was no better than the Polish, thus alienating the Novgorodians. For a brief moment

the Swedes and Poles found common ground, an accord that soon failed as Pozharskii's diplomacy, preying on their suspicions and self-interest, led them to disengage.

The discussions pertaining to the future election of a Swedish heir were nothing but window dressing. A Protestant Swedish prince was no more acceptable to Pozharskii than a Catholic Austrian archduke but such arguments had to be employed" [8, p. 215].

Swedish intervention was a powerful shock to the beleaguered Russians, and it greatly complicated and slowed down their Efforts to expel the Poles from Moscow [3, p. 421; 5, p. 209].

Thus, the year 1612 was noted for the game of intrigue that all chose; Russians, Poles, and Swedes, being the major participants. The result was Pozharskii neutralizing Sweden. With this achieved the Prince turned his attention back to Moscow and the Poles in the Kremlin. In late October 1612, the Kremlin and its Polish occupiers surrendered to Prince Dimitrii.

Before the Time of Troubles could officially be declared over, Russia had to elect a Tsar. The choice was Michael Romanov Tsar (1612–1645). Cossacks sitting in the Zemskii Sobor proclaimed for Michael Romanov on 7 February 1613. The Cossacks and people of Russia demanded a Russian as Tsar. (Whatever behind the scene machinations of Trubetskoi and others they were swept aside.) The boyars accepted a fait accompli and, though they hissed in private, agreed that "Let us have Misha Romanov for he is young and not yet wise; he will suit our purposes" [3, p. 441–442]. Michael thus became the "God chosen" ruler of Russia and the legitimacy lost with the death of Tsar Fedor in 1598 was restored with the Romanovs.

The Treaty of Stolbovo, 27 February 1617 (O.S. 17 February) ended the war between Russia and Sweden. Russia lost Esteria and Livonia and Sweden renounced claim to Novgorod. Most significantly Michael Romanov was recognized as Tsar, thus putting to an end any thought of Sweden gaining the throne. The

Treaty of Deulino, signed on 1 December 1618, marked an end to the Polish war (at least for the moment). It was a fourteen year truce that was humiliating to Russia, as Smolensk and Chernigov regions were ceded to Lithuania. Sigismund also obtained a large quantity of military stores, as well as thirty towns. How long before another war?

At the beginning of this chapter a point was made that pretendership was not a unique phenomenon, neither unique to Russia nor wherever there was monarchy. Maureen Perrie observes that a myriad of pretenders appeared in England, France, Portugal, Rome and Persia. "Pretense was not an exclusively Russian phenomenon" [5, p. 1]. These men from divergent interest groups were motivated by forces beyond their control. Were there great societal changes occurring, such as the decline of feudalism? Was the disquiet stimulated by apocalyptic millenarian tensions, was it class struggle, the "small people" against the "big people"? Was it dynastic acquisitiveness as Sweden and Poland vied for the tsar's throne? All had their place in the history of Smutnoe Vremia. With this suggested let it be pointed out that pretendership in Russia "has long been considered to have had particular significance...." [5, p. 2].

The authors came to a conclusion that the situation which happened in Russia at the beginning of the XVII century would never come about in our future as the human society of our days is at another level.

Till now all nations and all countries would prevent any possibility of foreign intervention and would do their best to keep its sovereignty. At the same time the process of globalization makes the world more vulnerable as military and political actions could come to a global conflict. And we should mention that all nations and courtiers have new interests in solution of global problems which make the necessity to unite efforts to keep the planet to be in safety and prosperious.

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